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Abstract 
 
The budgeting process has been recently reformed in Italy (L. 196/2009) in order to improve control of budget 
and transparency in the provision of clear information on government fiscal policy. Indeed, the general 
government final expenditures often deviate significantly from the initial forecasted amounts. Therefore, 
although the initial budget is often formulated in contractionary stance compared with the previous year’s final 
account, the final outcome turns out to be expansionary. As a consequence, confidence in the reliability of 
expenditure estimates in the initial budget and in the value of the initial budget as an indicator of the stance of 
fiscal policy have been undermined.    
Using real-time data for Italy, reported in the Relazione Previsionale e Programmatica (RPP) and in the Relazione 
Unificata sull’Economia e la Finanza Pubblica (RUEF), we explore fiscal plans and their implementation for GDP 
and general government aggregated and disaggregated items of revenue, expenditure and budget balance over the 
period 1998-2009. Both reports are employed with the aim of measuring the budgetary policy implementation 
error, following the methodology of Beetsma et al. (2009). We focus on the first year of the fiscal plans because 
budgetary slippages mainly occur in this year (Balassone et al. 2010).  
The main findings suggest that implemented budgetary adjustment falls systematically short of planned 
adjustment for GDP, for primary balance and overall balance. Actually, the main determinants of the 
implementation error of both primary and overall balance are the expenditures, in particular, the capital 
expenditures. Moreover, it seems that errors in macroeconomic forecasts cannot be considered the driving force 
of the budgetary slippages. Our results are in line with the strand of literature (von Hagen 1992; von Hagen and 
Harden 1994; Alesina and Perotti 1999; Tanaka 2003) according to which credible plans are the conditio sine qua 
non for healthy budget outcomes and resorting fiscal transparency and accountability. To improve public 
budgeting in Italy, we deem necessary a renewed commitment by policy makers in term of planning and control 
of public expenditures. 
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1. Introduction  
 
A budget is a plan for the future. Good budgeting requires good forecasting. Revenue and expenditure 
forecasting is an integral part of government budget process and it plays an important role in public budgeting 
and financial management. Moreover, fiscal estimates are “fiscal signals” for outside forward-looking private 
agents, forecasters and analysts (Davis 1980; Morrison 1986), who base their expectations not only on what 
happened in the past, but on officially released data for the future. Fiscal forecasts are also essential to deliver 
fiscal discipline under super-national fiscal rules, such as the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU countries. 
In view of the increasing prominence and sensitivity of budgetary forecasts, we examine the measurement of 
fiscal forecasting performance and, in particular, we address the problem of the evaluation of the budgetary 
forecast errors, i.e. the variations between actual revenues and expenditures from their forecasted values. These 
errors are indicative of the non-optimization or the non-attainment of set objectives of fiscal policy. In general, 
errors in budgetary forecasts can occur because of endogenous and exogenous factors, which include 
overestimation/underestimation of revenues and expenditures; assessment of GDP growth; price level 
variations; oil or commodities price shocks; etc. Ample forecast errors may have significant implications: 
excessive financing of deficits, debt accumulation, cutbacks of crucial public expenditure, such as investment. “A 
lack of credibility [in budgetary forecasts] increases the likelihood of overshooting the deficit target or increasing 
the level of arrears. This can arise from pressures created by over-optimistic revenue forecasts and under-
budgeting of non-discretionary expenditures (e.g. utilities, salaries, entitlement payments). It can also arise from 
non-compliance in budget execution (e.g. revenue leakages or unbudgeted expenditures)” (World Bank 2005).  
We address the accuracy of fiscal forecasting for Italy, where the budgeting process has been recently 
reformed (Law 196/2009) in order to improve control of the budget and transparency in the provision of 
information on government fiscal policy. Indeed, there is evidence of systematic forecast errors in fiscal 
variables: after 2001, final expenditures have often deviated significantly from the initial amount (Graph 1) and 
the budgetary stance, although formulated in a contractionary way, proved to be expansionary in its final 
outcome. Besides, the frequent use of supplementary budgets has undermined confidence in the reliability of 
expenditure estimates in the initial budget and in its value as an indicator of the stance of fiscal policy (IMF 
2001).  
  To explore the issue of fiscal forecasting in Italy, we follow the strand of literature of Forni and Momigliano 
(2004), Cimadomo (2007), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2009) and Beetsma et al. (2009), employing first-release data, or 
real-time data, which are closer to those available to the policymaker when he forms his plans and implements his 
policies. The main problem of ex post data is that they ignore that budgeting takes place actually in distinct 
phases: the planning stage (that contains the preparation of the budget proposal) and the implementation stage 
(in which taxes are collected and the money is spent). In addition, ex-post data may differ from ex-ante plans both 
because new information have became available to the policymaker during the year and because of changes in 
policy during the budget implementation. Actually, ex-ante plans may themselves be biased by excessive 
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optimism, political factors, government myopia and formal respect of fiscal rules. This ex-ante bias gives rise to 
underestimation or overestimation of fiscal variables and thus to ex-post “errors”.   
 
Graph 1–Primary expenditure to GDP:  budget draft and actual data - 1998-2009 (%) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on RPP and RTC/RUEF data.  
 
Concentrating on one single country, Italy, allows us to provide a greater detail on the budgetary process, 
while using the original national documents allows us to analyze a higher number of fiscal variables. This is more 
difficult with cross-country data as availability and homogeneity problems may arise and then limit the analysis of 
fiscal forecasting performance across countries. In fact, although a number of studies have compared 
macroeconomic forecast accuracy of private sector economists and international organizations (Artis 1996; Ash 
et al. 1998; Loungani 2000; Artis and Marcellino 2001; Isiklar et al. 2004), many others have focused on single 
countries (Tanaka 2003 for Japan; Paleologou 2005 for UK; Mühleisen et al. 2005 for Canada; Chakraborty and 
Sinha 2008 for India; Balassone et al. 2010 for Italy), given the difficulty in obtaining a cross-country data set of 
comparable budget forecasts.  
We consider data released from 1998 to 2009 at two steps of the budgetary process: the budget preparation 
and the budget discussion and approval by the Parliament. The source for the first set of data is the Relazione 
Previsionale e Programmatica (RPP).1The RPP is issued in September (year t-1) and includes the government’s plan 
for the budget of the following year (t), which is going to be presented to the Parliament. The source of the 
second set of data is the fourth (for year t-1) Relazione Trimestrale di Cassa (RTC), which is published in March 
(year t). It incorporates the Annual Budget Law as approved by the Parliament. From 2007 and until 2009 the 
fourth RTC has been included in the Relazione Unificata sulla Economia e la Finanza Pubblica (RUEF),2 which is also 
                                                           
1 RPP was introduced by Law 639/1949 and revised by further laws (i.e., L. 468/1978). The recent budget reform, (L. 
196/2009) abolished it. 
2 The budget reform (L. 196/2009) replaced RUEF with the Relazione sull’ Economia e la Finanza Pubblica (REF). 
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issued in March (year t). RUEF updates the macro scenario for the ongoing year, presents the budget for the year 
and surveys the economic and fiscal performance of the country in the previous year.  
By using data from these official reports published in two different stages of the budget horizon, we capture a 
sort of snapshot on the “stretching” nature of the budget process. To investigate the nature of the observed 
differences, we try to decompose them into a planned adjustment and an implementation error, according to 
Beetsma et al. (2009) methodology (see Section 3). This allows us to investigate the source of the budgetary 
slippages, also by identifying which part of budgetary slippages can be attributed to the revenue or to the 
expenditure side of the budget; which part of the slippages can be attributed to a lack of implementation of 
planned measures; which part is due to forecast biases in macroeconomic variables (such as economic growth or 
inflation). We also try to analyze constant patterns in the behaviour of the policymaker in order to find evidence 
of a strategic use of fiscal projections, as already documented by Moulin and Wierts (2006), Beetsma et al. (2009) 
and von Hagen (2010). By using the decomposition proposed by Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969), we distinguish 
two parts in the implementation error: a systematic error and a discretionary error. To end, we analyze the role of 
two possible determinants of the implementation error: GDP forecasts and the autumn parliamentary session.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature on the subject and Section 3 describes the 
conceptual framework and the adopted methodology. Section 4 presents the decomposition of the observed 
fiscal outcomes into fiscal planning and implementation errors for both aggregate and disaggregate general 
government public expenditures and revenues. This section also includes the analysis on the potential causes of 
the errors through the variance decomposition analysis. Section 5 discusses the potential determinants of 
implementation errors. Finally, the main findings and their policy implications are summarised in Section 6. 
 
 
2.  A summary of the literature 
  
The literature on budgetary forecast evaluation has searched for proof of cautionary or optimistic biases and has 
tested the policymaker’s efficient use of available information to minimize the forecast error. In fact, the Finance 
Minister- who produces the projections - can use them strategically to influence the assessment of super-national 
authorities (European Commission, IMF, World Bank) and the behaviour of the government’s spending 
ministers. The electoral cycle, fiscal rules and budgetary institutions can also influence the production of fiscal 
forecasts.  
Strauch et al. 2004 evaluate budgetary forecasts for a group of relatively homogenous countries (Euro zone 
members) in the years 1991-2002, suggesting that the size of forecast errors may depend on the structural 
characteristics of a country’s budgetary framework.  In particular, countries where fiscal policy is based on a 
commitment or contract approach (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999), i.e. on pre-negotiated contracts within the 
government coalition (Finland, Netherlands, Belgium) seem to have a cautionary bias in their forecasts due to the 
costs of renegotiation. On the contrary,  in countries where the Minister of Finance has strong discretionary 
power (delegation approach, such as in France, Germany, UK), there is no need to build in a safety margin in the 
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budgetary forecasts, as the Finance Minister can make adjustments in fiscal policy when needed. Fragmented 
forms of governance (Italy and Spain until the mid 1990s) show instead an optimistic bias in their fiscal forecasts.  
Von Hagen (2010) extends the analysis of Strauch et al., (2004), using data from the annual Stability and 
Convergence Programs (SCP) for EMU countries for the years 1998-2004. He explains forecasting errors on the 
base of variables related to the form of fiscal governance (commitment vs. delegation approach) and to the 
strength of fiscal rules. There is evidence that governments with a contract approach and strong fiscal rules are 
excessively cautious in their fiscal forecasts, while delegation countries present an upward bias in their 
projections. The last result is explained by the greater margin for manoeuvre of governments with delegation 
fiscal governance, which can more easily adjust their fiscal policy during the year and use their optimistic 
forecasts to formally respect the Stability and Growth Pact.   
Jonung and Larch (2006) and von Hagen (2010) find that average projections errors are negative for GDP, 
the general government budget balance, revenues and expenditures, meaning that governments tend to be overly 
optimistic. The large size of the confidence intervals adds that fiscal projections are rather imprecise. Actually, 
Buettner and Kauder (2009) have reviewed the practice and performance of revenue forecasting in selected 
OECD countries, finding that the mean forecast errors are small in most countries. However, countries’ 
forecasts differ substantially in precision. These differences can be attributed to a large part to the different 
timing of the forecasts, to the use of macro models and to the number of taxes: a small variety of large tax 
instruments seems to cause large forecasts errors than a large variety of small taxes. 
A basic institutional aspect of fiscal forecasting is the assignment of the forecasting task to specific 
institutions. Indeed, forecasting is commonly assigned to a department of the government, of the Ministry of 
Finance (Belgium, France, Italy, Ireland, Japan) or of the Treasury (United Kingdom, New Zealand). In some 
cases, forecasting is assigned to independent research institutes (Netherlands, Austria) to external experts from 
academia or to forecasting agencies included in the government group of forecasters. Buettner and Kauder 
(2009) construct an index of independence of revenue forecast institutions and find that the precision of the 
forecasts is positively associated with it. Bretschneider et al. (1989) argue that the existence of two separate 
forecasts by the legislative and the executive branch in the US States has a positive effect on forecasting accuracy, 
in particular, when both forecasts are forced into a consensus. 
Jonung and Larch (2006) show that the forecasts published by governments relying on independent 
forecasting agencies have a smaller bias and recommend that all governments in EMU should be asked to use 
forecasts from independent agencies. They find evidence of considerable variation in the forecasting 
performance of the EU member countries and they show that the projections are often biased and inefficient. 
These findings cast some doubt on either the governments’ ability to produce good forecasts or their willingness 
to disclose all the information they have. On the other hand, Leal et al. (2007) remind that, although independent 
agencies are not subject to the potential bias of political and institutional factors, they usually lack insufficient 
inside information to provide accurate and detailed forecasts of fiscal variables. 
Until recently, empirical research on fiscal policy behaviour was largely based on ex post (i.e., latest available or 
revised) data of fiscal outcomes, used to estimate fiscal policy reaction functions (Bohn 1998; Favero 2003; 
Balassone and Francese 2004; Annett 2006). Indeed, ex post data may substantially differ from ex ante data, as new 
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or more precise information (for example, on potential output growth) become available in time. Moreover, ex 
post data may differ from the real-time data available to policymakers because construction methodologies change 
as time passes. Likewise, data from international organisations such as the OECD and the IMF, which are often 
used in fiscal policy studies, are “filtered” in the sense that they are based on independent growth projections, 
and they take into account only those measures that are likely to be implemented in practice. Hence, the goal of 
producing unbiased forecasts is attached to a high weight in the objective functions of these institutions. 
An alternative strand of literature is provided by Forni and Momigliano (2004), Cimadomo (2007), Giuliodori 
and Beetsma (2009) and Beetsma et al .(2009), who employ first-release data, or real-time data, which are close to 
those available to the policymaker when he forms his plans and implements his policies. Some studies also 
combine real-time with ex post data (Forni and Momigliano 2004; Cimadomo 2007; Hughes Hallet et al. 2007; 
Bernoth et al. 2008; von Hagen 2010) to find a reason why fiscal policies which are counter-cyclical at the 
planning stage, when measured in real-time data, turn out to be pro-cyclical, when measured with revised ex-post 
data. Hughes Hallet et al. (2007), for example, study the size of these differences for the output gap and for 
cyclically-adjusted budget balances for OECD countries and conclude that fiscal surveillance based on real-time 
information may be misleading. Von Hagen (2010) concludes that real-time data in the Stability and 
Convergence Plans are not reliable (unbiased) projections. Nevertheless, when exploring the determinants of the 
planning and implementation stages of fiscal policy, real-time data seem more suitable, as they  capture more 
accurately the information sets on which the policymakers’ decision are based. These real-time forecasts provide 
also the fiscal framework that the national Parliaments approve.  
We evaluate fiscal projections on the basis of real-time data, in line with Beetsma and Giuliodori (2009) and 
Beetsma et al. (2009). While both contributions employ real-time data from international organisations (OECD, 
Europe's Stability and Convergence Programs), we consider, instead, data from two official Italian reports. We 
thus measure the fiscal policy implementation error making reference to two different stages along the budget 
process: the presentation of the government budget proposal for year t, as documented by the RPP in September 
of year t-1, and the final approval of the Budget Law by the Parliament, as documented by the RTC/RUEF in 
March of year t. In this way both the implementation errors and the changes due to the Parliamentary discussion 
are captured. In fact, during the autumn budgetary session the Government and the Parliament can make 
changes to both expenditures and revenues in the budget to pursue their own political targets, while keeping 
unchanged the budget balance targets set in the spring programming documents, as required by the budget rules 
(L. 362/1988) (see session 3 below). 
We propose a case-study for Italy, as data problems generally limit the analysis of fiscal forecasting 
performance across countries. Besides, our focus on Italy allows us to consider specific items of expenditures 
and revenues, whereas much of the literature has mainly centred on the issue of budget and deficit forecasting 
(Strauch et al. 2004; Jonung and Larch 2006), for which longer time series are available. 
 
 
 
 
 3. Conceptual framework, data and methodology.
 
In this section, we first describe the budget process, the data and the related fiscal reports we use. Then, we 
discuss the methodology applied to formally decompose the observed fiscal adjustment into planned adjustment 
and an implementation error.  
 
3.1. The budget process and related documents
 
In detail, actual fiscal policymaking takes place
affected by its own determinants.3 Von Hagen and Harden (1995) describe a full budget cycle as consisting of 
four steps: i) the planning process 
Parliament; iii) the budget implementation; iv) 
The budget cycle relevant for our analysis is the one in force until 2009, when the Budget Reform Law 
changed it. For year t the budget cycle follows the following steps, which are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 - The budget process in Italy    
 
Forecast in t-1 and in t for budget of year 
 
                                  1−t                                                                                                     
 
Actual data in t+1 for budget of year 
                                    1+t                                                                                                  
Note: The figure represents the budgetary process until 2009, reform 
Source: Authors’ elaborations. 
                                                          
3 In the majority of OECD countries, the responsibility for
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framed within a medium-term horizon in al
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et al. 2005). 
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The main stages for our analysis are: 
i) Planning. In the early spring of year t-1, the programming sessions open with the Guidelines and rules for 
the budget preparation, issued by the Ministry of Finance. The Documento di Programmazione Economico-
Finanziaria (DPEF), issued in June and approved by a Parliament’s resolution, presents the macroeconomic and 
fiscal framework for the following 3 to 4 years, the hypothesis on which the fiscal forecasting are based and the 
government for the budget balance. This target will be kept unchanged throughout the budget preparation. In 
September, macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts are updated and when significant changes with respect to the 
DPEF are observed, the Ministry of Finance submits an update note to DPEF (Nota di Aggiornamento al DPEF).  
At the end of September of year t-1, both the Budget and the Financial Law (legge finanziaria) Proposals are 
submitted to the Parliament. The Parliament presents fiscal policy interventions which are functional to public 
finance targets. The macroeconomic framework and the first planned budget forecast including detailed 
government target for expenditure and revenues items are described in the November volume of the Relazione 
Previsionale e Programmatica (RPP).4 
ii) The budget approval. The Parliament budgetary session spans from October to December. The Parliament 
has the right to change both revenues and expenditures, provided that the target budget balance is unchanged. 
The Government can also amend its initial budget proposal, under the same condition. In year t, the spring issue 
of the Relazione Trimestrale di Cassa5 (RTC/RUEF from 2007) presents the final budgetary forecasts for the year t 
taking into account the final macroeconomic and public finance data for year t-1 (preliminary outturn data) 
provided by ISTAT (on 1st March)  
iii) The budget Execution, whose partial results are recorded by the RPP of year t. 
 
In order to analyze the budget planning process we use data from both RPP and RTC/RUEF over the entire 
period 1998-2009. For year t, the RPP6 of year t-1is used to assess first budget forecasts (including target 
proposals) and RPP of year t is used to assess the preliminary budget implementation. RTC/RUEF of year t 
accounts for final budgetary forecast for year t(including approved target) and RTC/RUEF of year t+1 accounts 
for preliminary outturn data. 
                                                           
4 In detail, RPP is made up of two volumes: the first is presented by the Minister of Economy and Finance (MEF) to the Parliament by 
the end of September, while the second is issued in November. We draw from this second volume as it presents the last fiscal report for 
the year (see also Balassone et al. 2010). It sets out the estimates of public finance variables for the current year and forecasts for the 
following year and for the medium term, updating the macroeconomic framework of the Documento di Programmazione Economico-Finanziaria 
(DPEF). Moreover, the RPP analyzes the Budget Law and its effects. Hence, it has both economic and technical-financial features as it 
outlines the general economic context where the Budget Law is proposed and, at the same time, it analytically describes the decisions 
taken during the budget process. 
5 The RTC and the RUEF contain the public sector cash requirements, the economic trends in the previous year and the updated 
forecasts for the current year. More precisely, RTC and RUEF include preliminary forecasts of variables for the next year, estimates of 
variables for the current year and revised values of variables over the previous year. 
6 The use of RPP is also preferable to that of DPEF as the latter seldom include plans for revenues and expenditures 
Indeed, DPEF usually sets only targets for the primary and overall balances in the years to come and provide information 
on the size of the fiscal adjustment to be implemented. On the contrary, RPP provides a full set of accounts, taking into 
consideration the budget for the following year as submitted to Parliament at the end of September. In addition, RPP 
includes updated fiscal and macroeconomic projections compared to DPEF. This is especially relevant for those, relatively 
frequent, instances in which the Government passed a mid-year budget during the summer, after the DPEF was approved. 
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The choice of considering two points of observation - Autumn and Spring - and, consequently, two fiscal 
reports is due to the characteristics of the Italian budget process and to the pressures on fiscal policy during the 
budget session. Each report, beyond its general function, has a specific value within the “cycle” of the official 
documents which basically reflects the budget process.  
To explore forecast errors, we compare GDP and fiscal variables projections published in each official report 
(RPP and RTC/RUEF) at the distance of one year. When using the data from RPP (November), the differences 
we observe are caused not only by the running of time but also by the changes to the budget decided during the 
Parliament budgetary session. Data from RTC/RUEF already include these changes and thus reported 
differences are the results of the many factors that influence the budget implementation.  
 
3.2. The methodology 
 
While many contributions explain the overall fiscal outcomes by estimating a fiscal reaction function, we employ 
a systematic decomposition of fiscal outcomes into plans and implementation and, given the available 
information on the underlying macroeconomic scenario, we explore the role of unanticipated economic 
developments in deviations from the plans. By using the decomposition proposed by Beetsma et al. (2009), actual 
budgetary adjustments (as measured by the change in a budgetary variable) can be calculated as the sum between 
its planned change (P) and the deviation from it (E): 
 
(1)                                            ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
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where the superscript referred to the year of the document publication and the subscript referred to the year 
under analysis. The term on the left-hand side is the observed (or actual) fiscal adjustment - ( )111 +++ −= tttt YYA  - and 
measures the actual budgetary adjustment observed between years t andt+1, based on the information available 
in year t+1. The value of A can be explained by the planned change decided in year t and contained in the 
government draft budget and in the annual budget law - ( )tttt YYP −= +1  - and by the deviations from this plans 
( ) ( )tttttttt YYYYE −−−= ++++ 1111 , the so-called implementation error.  
The advantage of the above decomposition is that it allows us to mitigate the fact that data may come from 
different releases and that budgetary figures may differ in the way they are constructed. Therefore, 
methodological changes that affect, for example, the construction of 11
+
+
t
tY should also affect the construction of 
1+t
tY and, thus, (largely) cancel out when differences are taken.  
We focus on the first year of the fiscal plan (one-year ahead projections) because in Italy a large fraction of 
the budgetary slippages occur in the first year of the plan (see Balassone et al. 2010). Equation (1) is estimated 
over the period 1998-2009, using data of the two reports, RPP for the draft budget proposed by the government 
and RTC/RUEF for the budget law approved by the Parliament.  
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According to previous studies (Moulin and Wierts 2006; Von Hagen 2010), we expect that fiscal projections 
are used strategically, implying that implementation errors are not unbiased. Moreover, we are interested in the 
size and variability of the implementation errors relative to planned adjustment in order to evaluate the 
information content of the annual budget law in relation to the observed fiscal adjustment. 
 
 
4. Implementation errors 
 
 
Graph2 shows the decomposition of actual total and primary deficit7 change into planned changes and 
implementation errors. Data from the government budget draft (RPP) generally show planned improvements in 
the deficit and negative errors, meaning that the actual adjustment was less than expected. Data from the budget 
law (RTC/RUEF) show less ambitious targets (except in 2006 and in 2001 for the primary deficit only) and 
smaller implementation errors (except in 2001 and 2007), which may be due to better information on 
macroeconomic variables. 
 
Graph 2 - Decomposition of deficit measures: 1998-2009 (million EUR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
7
 When we consider the implementation error and the planning for deficit variables, it has to be kept in mind that all the 
original data used for calculating A, P and E in equation (1) are negative values, so a special attention has to be paid  to the 
signs of the items of equation (1). Positive/negative values mean an improvement/worsening of deficit. 
-50000
-40000
-30000
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Plan Deficit RPP Plan Deficit RUEF
Error Deficit RPP Error Deficit RUEF
-50000
-40000
-30000
-20000
-10000
0
10000
20000
30000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Plan PrimDeficit RPP Plan PrimDeficit RUEF
Error PrimDeficit RPP Error PrimDeficit RUEF
 11
Source: Authors’ elaborations on RPP and RTC/RUEF data.  
 
Looking at the two sides of the budget - revenues and expenditures - we observe a great difference in plans 
and results (Graph 3). For the budget draft, errors in revenues are positive until 2001 and in 2006. For the 
approved budget, errors on revenues are positive from 2002 to 2006. This means that revenue windfalls are 
different according to the budget stage which we consider.   
On the expenditure side, planned total expenditure increases tend to be greater in the budget law 
(RTC/RUEF) than in the government’s budget draft (RPP). Some exceptions occur in 2003, 2008 and 2009. 
Implementation errors tend to be positive in both cases (except for 1998-2001 and in 2007 and 2009 considering 
RUEF), thus generating actual expenditure which is larger than planned.  
GDP projected increases do not show large differences between the government budget draft and the 
approved budget (except in 2008). Moreover, during the recession years (2008-2009), errors move towards the 
same direction and show a negative trend, especially for the budget draft. We will concentrate on the analysis of 
the disaggregated expenditure, reported in Graph 4, while we will present in the appendix the revenue items for 
completeness. Nearly for all items of expenditure, there is evidence of large and positive implementation errors 
in the years 2004-06: these years correspond to the end of the second (2001-05) and to the third (2005-06) right-
wing Berlusconi governments. While the election years 2001 and 2008 do not seem to affect so much the budget 
errors, the election year 2006 shows impressive peaks in the implementation errors of expenditure variables.  
Interest expenditure - basically an exogenous item for the policy-maker - is subject to fluctuating forecasted 
changes (negative at the start of EMU and then positive) and large (mainly negative) implementation errors 
which offset the initial forecasts in many years. Salaries show large and positive implementation errors 
concentrated in the years 2004-07. Consumption expenditure reveals big difficulties of control: the policymaker’s 
decision to reduce it in the budget draft (1998-2000 and 2006-07) is always denied, as shown by large positive 
implementation errors. Even when, more realistically, the policymaker forecasts positive variations of 
consumption expenditure, errors tend to be positive. 
However, the policy-maker does not seem to revise so much his/her plans for social expenditure between the 
draft and the approved budget. As could be expected, capital expenditure planning appears to be much more 
subject to revisions during the autumn budgetary session and, after 2004, it is also subject to large 
implementation errors, which tend to be positive with budget law, to correct the policymaker’s planned negative 
changes. Positive plans and negative errors occur with budget draft only in 2005 and in 2008. In turn, primary 
expenditure confirms the main results, showing positive implementation errors in all years (except in 2002 and 
2008). 
To some extent, positive implementation errors for expenditure items seem to convey the suggestion that the 
policy-maker is incapable of maintaining his/her planned adjustments, thus he/she repeatedly resorts to ex post 
increases. In this vein, some questions may arise. Is the policy-maker too optimistic in his/her plans or is he/she 
just not able to resist to the expenditure bias? In order to shed some light on this issue, we deeply investigate 
which components are likely to determine variability in the fiscal outcomes and we identify their contribution 
through the variance decomposition technique. 
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Graph 3 - Decomposition for aggregate measures: revenues, expenditures, primary expenditure and GDP: 1998-2009 
(million EUR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on RPP and RTC/RUEF data. 
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Graph 4 -Items of the expenditure side: 1998-2009 (million EUR). 
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Source: Authors’ elaborations on RPP and RTC/RUEF data. 
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4.1. Variance decomposition 
 
Using the variance decomposition methodology for the observed fiscal adjustment means to solve the 
following equation: 
 
(2)                                                             )E;Acov()P;Acov()A(Var +=  
 
where )(AVar  represents the variance of the actual adjustment which can be obtained by summing the 
covariance between actual values and plans - );cov( PA  - and the covariance between actual and the 
implementation error linked thereto ( );cov( EA ). Results of equation (2) are reported in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 - The variance decomposition: 1998-2009 (billion EUR and %) 
 RPP RUEF 
Budget Items Var (A) 
Cov(A;P)/ 
Var(A) 
Cov(A;E)/ 
Var(A) Var (A) 
Cov(A;P)/ 
Var(A) 
Cov(A;E)/ 
Var(A) 
EXPENDITURES 
Consumption 2476.49 46.85% 53.15% 4030.76 36.71 63.29 
Salaries 7036.66 36.72% 63.28% 6589.47 60.48 39.52 
Social expenditure 14258.12 62.32% 37.68% 9852.07 62.85 37.15 
Other Expenditure 3927.23 71.43% 28.57% 5861.15 34.62 65.38 
Interest expenditure 24667.34 45.51% 54.49% 41891.26 61.13 38.87 
Current primary expenditure 23859.41 155.87% -55.87% 19100.83 556.63 -456.63 
Capital Expenditure 79926.63 -28.98% 128.98% 91082.63 20.30 79.70 
Primary expenditure 111275.44 9.29% 90.71% 120407.47 38.94 61.06 
Current Expenditure 74933.02 45.72% 54.28% 70221.62 112.83 -12.83 
Total expenditure 116611.55 2.09% 97.91% 200549.24 19.29 80.71 
REVENUES 
Direct Tax 57208.39 43.80 56.20 130245.18 5.39 94.61 
Indirect Tax 140592.26 -7.54 107.54 125920.01 16.08 83.92 
Social contribution 76634.60 10.91 89.09 52066.37 104.19 -4.19 
Other revenues (not tributary) 1289.80 4.90 95.10 2401.45 6.04 93.96 
Capital Revenues 33601.07 56.86 43.14 59221.82 43.09 56.91 
Current Revenues 437973.87 14.95 85.05 332607.19 39.61 60.39 
Total Revenues 175366.47 19.76% 80.24% 271544.18 43.41 56.59 
Deficit  231383.19 29.48% 70.52% 212993.42 78.77 21.23 
Primary Deficit 305365.05 35.00% 65.00% 296579.20 79.58 20.42 
GDP 724638.68 4.47% 95.53% 723301.91 92.82 7.18 
Note: The first column represents the variance of A, while the second and third ones are covariances as a share of 
the variance.  
Source: Authors’ elaborations on RPP and RTC/RUEF data. 
 
When, considering data from the budget law (RTC/RUEF), we find that the implementation error is 
the main player in determining the variance of the actual changes of total expenditures. Indeed, the 
implementation error for total expenditures represents about 81 percent of the overall variability. This 
result appears to be consistent with Beetsma et al. (2009). Among expenditure items, this is mostly true for 
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capital expenditure - as about 80 percent of the total variability is determined by the implementation error 
- consumption and primary expenditure. On the contrary, for other expenditure items, the main 
contribution to the variability in the actual value is caused by its covariance with the planned adjustment. 
As for revenues, the dominance of the implementation error seems to prevail for disaggregated items than 
for aggregate variables. 
Data from the budget draft (RPP) display some different findings. Indeed, errors affect revenues, 
expenditures, deficit and GDP variances and play a crucial role in shaping actual adjustment variability as 
);cov( EA  is always greater than );cov( PA . This result also holds for disaggregated revenue and 
expenditure items (exceptions are social expenditure, other expenditure, current primary expenditure and 
capital revenues). In general, this result can be explained by considering the timing of the forecast, 
normally characterized by a higher degree of uncertainty and lower information availability. Given the 
relative dominance of the covariance with the implementation errors - mostly with RPP data - it makes 
sense to better analyze the “nature” of these errors.  
To identify any regularity in the mood of the policymaker in making forecasts, we consider the 
difference between the two means squared of the change (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 - Summary statistics: 1998-2009 (billion EUR) 
 RPP RUEF 
 Mean Mean 
Budget Item  
A 
 
P 
 
E(A2)-E(P2 )(a) A           P E(A2)-E(P2 )(e) 
EXPENDITURES 
Total expenditures 23.65 15.37 322940.51 20.53 17.58 112315.56 
Consumption 3.59 0.12 12866.81 4.00 2.28 10792.56 
Salaries 5.62 3.49 19430.56 4.10 4.69 -5245.53 
Social expenditure 9.22 9.91 -13246.16 9.87 -0.48 97095.21 
Other expenditure 3.11 1.00 8660.91 2.56 2.62 -354.14 
Interest expenditure -1.10 0.04 1206.14 -2.46 -0.74 5489.04 
Current primary 
expenditure 21.54 10.88 345466.71 
20.52 1.62 418451.46 
Current Expenditure 20.44 15.23 185734.93 18.06 17.46 21253.97 
Capital Expenditure -2.23 -1.70 2062.41 3.36 -2.49 5057.45 
Primary expenditure 24.59 15.18 374241.66 23.88 13.38 391222.57 
REVENUES 
Revenues 19.47 20.86 -56076.17 17.77 18.32 -20156.27 
Direct Tax 5.39 6.17 -9004.54 4.86 7.59 -33926.97 
Indirect Tax 6.03 6.12 -1168.83 6.50 5.73 9453.02 
Social contribution 4.15 6.75 -28367.84 4.89 4.46 4016.12 
Other revenues (not 
tributary) 
1.81 0.86 2549.33 1.24 1.90 -2064.10 
Capital Tax 1.80 0.67 2787.79 0.48 -1.25 -1338.55 
Current Revenues 6.93 24.25 -539944.23 17.75 20.11 -89536.93 
Deficit  -4.18 5.48 -12576.92 -2.76 0.74 7083.91 
Primary Deficit -5.30 5.51 -2268.12 -4.09 0.92 15908.36 
GDP 40.16 50.87 -975379.26 34.65 41.73 -541127.29 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on RPP and RTC/RUEF data 
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In both documents (in particular for the budget draft) we observe a tendency towards underestimation on 
the expenditure side. It is measured by the following relation:  
 
(3)                                                            
22 )()( AEPE <  
 
This seems quite interesting, as “it means that the underestimation arises when past events bear a 
closer (and positive) relation to the formation of forecasts than to future realization” (Mincer and 
Zarnovitz (1969), p. 18). As a consequence, the results here obtained confirm that the past has a great 
importance in determining future realizations for both documents and, in particular, for the budget draft 
on the expenditure side and for the approved budget on the revenue side. This result is not surprising as 
generally the public budget is formed by a bottom-up approach. The difference in results between the two 
documents is quite reasonable given the time span for making projections and the impact of the budgetary 
session. 
 
 
5.  The determinants of the implementation errors 
 
 
It is now relevant to understand the reasons for the implementation errors and, in particular, the role of 
the GDP implementation error in affecting all other errors. Table 3 shows the level and the significance of 
this dependence through the Spearman correlations.8 Indeed, revenue errors in the budgetary draft (RPP) 
are characterized by a positive and significant correlation with GDP errors, as expected (0.64). Among 
revenue items only direct taxes (0.57) are positively correlated with GDP error. Among expenditure 
components, considering the budget draft (RPP) data, consumption (0.52), interest (0.68) and current 
primary expenditure (0.43) are positively and significantly correlated with the implementation error of 
GDP.   
Considering the approved budget data (RUEF), while revenues remain significant and positively 
correlated with GDP (0.57), current revenues become significant (0.64), and interest expenditure continue 
to be significantly correlated but with a negative sign (-0.55). 
The difference in the relations with the GDP error in the two documents could be explained by the 
different approach of the policymaker at the two stages of the budget process: he is initially guided by the 
tendency of the economy and then by other factors (political considerations, new acts and updated 
information). So we may conclude that, while implementation error of GDP can be the cause of slippages 
when preparing the budget draft, this determinant becomes weaker for the forecasts included in the 
approved budget.  
 
                                                           
8 The direct way to identify the determinants would be to calculate a regression with the implementation error as dependent and 
potential determinants as regressors. The insufficient number of data at disposal does not allow us to use this ordinary tool, so the 
only possibility is to use an indirect and less sophisticated approach. 
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Table 3 – The potential determinants of implementation error: Spearman correlation for GDP and the budgetary session. 
 
ρ (implementation error GDP, 
implementation error items) 
ρ (budgetary 
session, 
implementation 
error items) 
 RUEF RPP RPP 
Budget items    
EXPENDITURES 
Consumption 0.45 0.52** 0.30 
Salaries 0.18 -0.06 0.64* 
Social expenditure -0.09 -0.17 0.17 
Other expenditure 0.31 0.29 0.54** 
Interest expenditure -0.55* 0.68* 0.79* 
Current primary expenditure 0.43 0.52** 0.007 
Current Expenditure -0.08 0.29 0.55** 
Capital Expenditure 0.06 0.10 0.21 
Primary expenditure 0.16 -0.33 0.55** 
Total expenditure 0.44 -0.16 0.47 
REVENUES 
Direct Tax -0.34 0.57** 0.33 
Indirect Tax 0.05 0.46 0.66* 
Social contribution 0.53** -0.02 0.43 
Other revenues (not tributary) 0.43 0.14 0.08 
Capital Tax -0.33 0.05 -0.15 
Current Revenues 0.64* 0.22 0.34 
Total Revenues 0.57** 0.70* 0.52* 
Deficit  0.29 0.56** 0.75* 
Primary Deficit 0.44 0.72* 0.45 
GDP / / 0.18 
Note: Significance level: * 5%; ** 10%. 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on RPP and RTC/RUEF data. 
 
Another candidate for explaining the implementation error is the autumn budgetary session. Hence, we 
calculate the difference between the forecasted values released in the November and March reports for 
the same year and for each item ( RPPt
RUEF
t XX − ) over the period 1998-2009. This is a proxy of the 
effect of the budgetary session. The Spearman correlation between the implementation error (in RPP)9 
and this new variable is then calculated for each budgetary component (Table 3). 
Results suggest that the variation caused by the budgetary session have a strong positive and significant 
connection with the implementation error for indirect tax (0.66), total revenues (0.52), interest 
expenditures (0.79), salaries (0.64), current expenditures (0.55), primary expenditure (0.55) and total deficit 
(0.75). The intuition behind the result for current expenditures is quite easy to understand as this kind of 
expenditure is the main tool used by the Government to favor, and to some extent to satisfy, its 
constituencies. Yet, the high positive correlation for interest expenditures is more difficult to explain. We 
deem that a possible explanation could be that, during the budgetary session, a persistent tendency to 
                                                           
9 In this case we concentrate just on the budget draft as the approved budget includes already the effect of the budgetary session.  
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pushing up the projections for certain items is employed to build a safety margin for the budget 
implementation. 
 
5.1. Regularities in fiscal forecasting 
 
After having considered the exogenous economic and political factors which can determine and influence 
the formation of the implementation errors, we are now concerned with the endogenous elements which 
can be connected to the way of making forecast. This will reveal the existence of systematic errors. 
Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) first define the theoretical relation between planning (Pt) and realizations 
(R), satisfying 
ttt uPR +≡ , and  the line of perfect forecast when tu  is null. They, then, describe the 
accuracy of forecasts through the dispersion around this line by measuring it with the mean square error 
of the difference between realization and predictions: 
2)PR(E − . The last step in their reasoning is to 
distinguish three possible causes of the dispersion: 
- bias, i.e. the error given by considering the average of the predictions instead of the 
realizations;  
- inefficiency if, in presence of bias, the regression line explaining realizations in term of 
predictions has a different slope from the perfect line forecast; 
- random component which represents the information on the part of the variance of the 
realizations not explained by the least square regression line: 
 
(4)                                
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We apply the same approach to the implementation error, being aware of the fact that “economic 
forecasts may be intended and expressed as predictions of changes rather than of future levels”.10 The 
only difference is that while ordinarily the analysis in term of changes uses a constant basis, usually the last 
realization at disposal Rt-1, in our case the basis changes, reducing the base error11 it is made when 
considering a constant base.  
With respect to Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969), the other difference in our case is connected to the 
forecaster. The policymaker is, actually, a complex forecaster: for certain items, such as  GDP, he/she can 
be considered as an ordinary one who has his/her main target to predict the most precisely possible; for 
other items, instead, his/her forecast is instead the implementation of his political agenda. This means that 
the plan can be subject to changes due not only to unexpected events or economic shocks, but also to 
                                                           
10 Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969), p.14. 
11 The value of the realization in t-1 is not perfectly known and stable at the time of the forecast.  
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change of priorities in the political agenda. This is the reason why, instead of talking of error, the name we 
use for the differences between planning and actual values is implementation error. The implementation 
error then includes the ordinary forecast error and something more.  
Keeping this in mind, we consider then the first two components of equation (4) as representatives of 
the systematic error in forecasts. As the budget is usually formed according to a bottom-up process and 
according to legislation in force, the possibility of certain regularity in the implementation error is not out 
of the blue. The third component of equation (4) catches, instead, the mix of discretionality and random 
effect. In our case, following the definition of implementation error given by Beetsma et al. (2009), 
equation 4 can be rewritten as follows, by dividing for the mean square error and adapting it to a sample:    
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where A  and P are respectively the average of the actual and planned adjustments; AS  and PS  indicate 
their sample variances ; r 12 is the correlation coefficient between actual and fiscal adjustments; β 13 is the 
slope coefficient of the regression line of A  on P .  In this way it is possible to determine quite easily the 
weights of the three components (in percentage terms).  
The results of the decomposition are, to some extent, as expected (Tables 4). It emerges that the major 
role is played by the discretionary/random component, which corresponds to the “residual” item (on 
average, 58.44 and 67.13 percent for RPP and RUEF, respectively). The two other components play a 
different role for the two documents: for the budget draft, the mean component has a greater role than 
the slope component (on average, 24.36 and 17.21 percent respectively), the opposite happens for the 
approved budget (on average, 13.66and 19.22 percent, respectively).  
The two reports present differences. For the approved budget, in fact, a systematic bias occurs only for 
social expenditures, current primary and primary expenditure, leaving open room for possible 
improvements in forecasting and related techniques. For the budget draft, instead, all components are at 
work with a different weight. In general, the dominance of the discretionary /random nature of the error 
reduces the possibility of any correction. Generally speaking, we may conclude that while for the budget 
draft an adaptive approach (looking at the past for predicting the future which implies the repetition of 
the same type of errors), for the approved budget any kind of regularity seems to be excluded. 
 
 
 
                                                           
12 Actually, r2AP is equal to the coefficient determination of the regression of A on P. 
13 Because of the few data at disposal we don’t estimate β by a regression but we directly compute it through the 
algebraic equation : 
)E(
)P;A(Cov tt
2σ
β =  
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Table 4 - Decomposition of the implementation error with RPP and RUEF (%) 
 RPP RUEF 
 Percentage of RMSE accounted for by  Percentage of RMSE accounted for by  
 
Systematic component Random 
/Discretionary 
component 
Systematic component Random 
/Discretionary 
component 
Budget Item Mean component 
(MC)(b) 
Slope component 
(SC) (c) 
Residual Variance 
(RV) (d) 
Mean 
component 
(MC)  (f) 
Slope 
component 
(SC) (g) 
Residual 
Variance 
 (RV) (h) 
EXPENDITURES 
Total expenditures 31.24% 15.64% 53.12% 4.52% 4.03% 91.45% 
Consumption 51.56% 38.33% 10.11% 46.73% 4.56% 48.71% 
Salaries 25.69% 37.87% 36.44% 7.81% 10.03% 82.16% 
Social expenditure 2.94% 34.67% 62.39% 11.92% 44.22% 43.86% 
Other expenditure 0.00% 0.95% 0.05% 0.00% 0.08% 0.92% 
Interest expenditure 8.18% 0.53% 91.29% 24.40% 23.15% 52.45% 
Current primary 
expenditure 63.76% 29.59% 6.65% 9.02% 90.58% 0.41% 
Current Expenditure 31.89% 6.78% 61.33% 1.06% 43.81% 55.13% 
Capital Expenditure 0.05% 84.73% 15.21% 22.11% 22.36% 55.53% 
Primary expenditure 39.29% 12.36% 48.35% 22.58% 54.05% 23.37% 
REVENUES 
Total revenues 1.02% 13.92% 85.05% 0.21% 0.18% 99.61% 
Direct Tax 1.46% 5.68% 92.86% 4.36% 19.87% 75.77% 
Indirect Tax 0.01% 24.57% 75.42% 0.58% 0.92% 98.49% 
Social contribution 8.40% 2.70% 88.89% 3.97% 15.60% 80.43% 
Other revenues (not 
tributary) 37.46% 9.97% 52.57% 11.35% 25.90% 62.75% 
Capital Tax 6.77% 2.37% 90.86% 7.99% 0.07% 91.94% 
Current Revenues 40.09% 5.45% 54.47% 3.42% 12.54% 84.05% 
Deficit  34.39% 1.01% 64.60% 21.65% 0.01% 78.34% 
Primary Deficit 33.69% 2.03% 64.28% 37.25% 2.26% 60.49% 
GDP 13.72% 1.73% 84.55% 32.06% 2.61% 65.33% 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on RPP and RTC/RUEF data 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this study we propose a case-study for Italy, as data problems generally limit the analysis of fiscal 
forecasting performances across countries. Besides, our focus on Italy allows us to consider specific items 
of expenditures and revenues. By using real-time data and the Beetsma et al. (2009) approach, we evaluate 
fiscal projections at two steps of the budgetary process: the budget preparation (RPP) and the budget 
discussion and the approval by the Parliament (RUEF), from 1998 to 2009. This allows us to investigate 
graphically and formally the sources of budgetary slippages distinguishing between documents, budget 
sides and exogenous factors, GDP forecast errors and the influence of the autumn parliamentary session.  
We observe a great difference in plans and results looking at the two sides of the budget - revenues 
and expenditures. For the budget draft (RPP), errors in revenues are positive until 2001 and in 2006. For 
the approved budget (RUEF), errors on revenues are positive from 2002 to 2006. This means that 
revenue windfalls are different according to the budget stage which we consider. On the expenditure side, 
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planned total expenditure increases tend to be higher in the budget law (RUEF) than in the government 
budget draft (RPP). The analysis of the disaggregated expenditures reveals that the policy-maker has some 
difficulties in maintaining his planned adjustments, and thus he usually resorts to ex post increases. This is 
particularly true for interest expenditure and capital expenditure.  
In order to shed some light on this issue, we deeply investigate which components are likely to 
determine variability in the fiscal outcomes, identifying their contribution through the variance 
decomposition technique. We find that, the implementation error for expenditures represents about 81 
percent of the overall variability. This result confirms those of Beetsma et al. (2009). Among expenditure 
components, this is mostly true for capital expenditure where over 80 percent of the total variability is 
determined by the implementation error.  
Searching for the role of the GDP implementation error and of the budgetary session in affecting all 
other implementation errors, we employ the Spearman correlation. These reveal that the implementation 
error of GDP can be the cause of budgetary slippages when preparing the budget draft while its influence 
becomes weaker for the forecasts included in the approved budget. The budgetary session shows a strong 
role for interest expenditure, current expenditure, revenues, primary and total deficit. While this result is perfectly 
comprehensible for current expenditure, given the role of the expenditure as main tool used by the 
Government to favor its supporters, it appears less comprehensible for interest expenditure. The only 
possible explanation of this result is given by the fact that there is, during the budgetary session, a 
persistent tendency of pushing up the projections for certain items, just to use them to build a safety 
margin for the budget implementation . By looking at the regularities in the policy maker behavior at the 
time of forecasts, it is evident a tendency to underestimate expenditures, confirming the big role of past 
performance in determining future forecasts. This result is not surprising as the Italian budget is formed 
by a bottom up approach. 
When searching for systematic errors in fiscal forecasting we apply Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) 
methodology.  Our findings conclude for a systematic bias in the approved budget only for social 
expenditures, current primary and primary expenditure. This opens to possible improvements in 
forecasting and related techniques. For the budget draft, instead, in general the dominance of the 
discretionary /random nature of the error reduces the possibility of any correction.  
Our results lead us to conclude that improvements in the implementation of fiscal plans cannot be 
expected from the policymaker goodwill, but they could be worked out by means of more stringent fiscal 
rules and controls. We thus advocate the adoption of coherent and stringent medium term fiscal planning, 
which could be complemented by a set of fiscal rules, such as expenditure ceilings and debt brakes.    
Appendix - Items of the revenue side: 1998-2009 (million EUR). 
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Source: Authors’ elaborations on RPP and RTC/RUEF data 
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